Evaluating Nixons and Eisenhowers Use of Power free essay sample

Modern Presidency Research Paper Foreign Policy: Evaluating Nixon’s and Eisenhower’s’ Use of Power Both President Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon were presidents during the cold war. Their uses of presidential power within foreign policy greatly shaped the United State’s strategies in cold war politics. Comparing their actions as Chief Diplomat, Chief Legislator, Chief Executive and Commander in Chief shows how they have used both their formal and informal powers to lead the nation. President Eisenhower was much more successful in gaining congress approval through working with them yet had much more trouble dealing with peace abroad. Nixon was able to use powers to make successful gains within the cold war abroad, yet had trouble working with others at home. As Chief Diplomat, Dwight Eisenhower vocalized the domino theory, meaning that if one country fell to communism this would lead to the fall of another country and so on (Skidmore 2004, 259). During his presidency, he believed that many nations were susceptible to Soviet sponsored Communism and that proactive United States commitment to world affairs would deter this effect. He theorized that communication between the Soviet Union and the United states was critical to the safety of the world, even if both countries were stocking up on nuclear weapons (PBS Eisenhower 2002, 1). Using his formal powers as Chief diplomat, Eisenhower tried to make an executive agreement with the USSR. Open Skies was the name of this first proposal to the USSR, he proposed this at the 1955 Geneva Convention. His plan included each nation giving one another a full description of their military facilities, and allowing one another to conduct aerial inspections to make sure that the descriptions provided were correct. This plan was rejected by the Soviets because they had previous knowledge of the whereabouts of the United States military facilities (PBS Eisenhower 2002, 1). Eisenhower used his powers of executive agreements many times as Chief Diplomat. He commanded United States negotiations to maintain communication with the Soviets, trying to come to an agreement to ban nuclear testing (PBS Eisenhower 2002, 2). Eisenhower used this strategy when dealing with Korea as well, sending his secretary of state, John Dulles, to talk with Prime Minister Nehru. Dulles conveyed to Nehru a warning that if the resolutions n Korea stopped, the United States may expand the war. However, talking to leaders of Korea indirectly was not a successful use of his power because the warnings given to Nehru never reached Eisenhower’s intended audience (Damms 2002, 34). Eisenhower also used his informal powers as Chief Diplomat. In 1953, he gave a speech highlighting the large amount of human cost that the cold war could bring to both the USSR and the United States. He offered Georgi Malenkov the cooperation and goodwill of the United States in exchange for the USSR’s discontinuation of extension of land and influence over other nations. This use of informal powers also proved to be unsuccessful when the Russians responded coldly (PBS Eisenhower 2002, 1). During Eisenhower’s last years in office, he began to make a breakthrough by meeting with Nikita Khrushchev, secretary of the Communist party. This meeting was a successful use of formal diplomatic powers because they agreed to meet again in 1960. However, an unwise use of executive power disrupted their meeting (PBS Eisenhower 2002, 2). Although Ike tried diligently to make executive agreements with communist nations, he was unsuccessful. However, his diplomatic relations formed a base for the United States policy during the rest of the cold war. (Damms 2002, 109-110). As Chief diplomat, Nixon used a variety of formal and informal powers in foreign policy. Unlike Eisenhower who chose to follow a safe route, acting conservatively, Nixon was distinctly a chance taker. Nixon saw that he had extended powers, due to the fact that he served as president during a war. These extended powers added to Nixon’s ability to accomplish this, further tempted Nixon to achieve great changes within foreign policy (Melanson 1996, 45). Nixon was able to limit congress’s oversight of his administration, and the publics control by using the Chief Diplomat formal power of secrecy. He wanted to use these formal powers to show that the president could plan and execute foreign policy as efficiently as historic leaders (Small 1999, 61). Nixon used his power of executive agreements manipulatively in a strategy that he called, linkage politics; this is a term for strategically organizing the United States relationships with communist powers (Small 1999, 63). Nixon knew that he must settle the Vietnam War with honor because it was a stake in Southeast Asia. Using his theory of linkage politics he saw that the end of the Vietnam War would affect negotiations with China and Russia (Small, 1999 65). He first tried to make an executive agreement with Russia, by explaining to them his idea of â€Å"strategic parity. This was an idea that because both nations had enough weapons to completely demolishes the other, neither should start war, and peace would continue. Like Eisenhower’s attempts, Nixon was unable to make an agreement with the USSR and talks continued to be slow (PBS Nixon 2002, 2). Playing the China card was a new way Nixon was able to integrate his idea of linkage politics. His theory was that because China was afraid of the Soviets, they may purse relations with the United States, which in return, would help control the USSR (PBS Nixon 2002, 1). In 1970, Nixon began to implement this theory by engaging in covert talks with China at Warsaw, using his formal powers of secrecy and executive agreements. However, China was angered when Nixon increased US troops in Cambodia and ceased talks. Like Eisenhower, Nixon began to try to relay messages through other parties such as Pakistan and Romania to China. After a year of sending these messages, China finally opened up to discussion once again (PBS Nixon 2002, 2). President Nixon then used another informal power by setting up United States ping pong players to visit China. Before Nixon had done this, the United states and China had not had a cultural exchange since 1949. â€Å"Ping pong diplomacy† pleased most Americans and helped to advance Nixon’s relations with China. By doing so, he also helped improve his relations with Russia because they feared a strong relationship between China and the United States (PBS Nixon 2002, 2). In 1972, Nixon was finally able to meet with Chinese official, Lai, in China. During this meeting, Nixon did not make any agreements with China, but this started a friendly relationship with one another. Due to his strategies, Nixon was also able to meet with a Soviet official, Leonid Brezhnev, where he signed ten formal agreements, including an anti-ballistic treaty and the SALT Treaty (PBS Nixon 2002, 2-3). Eisenhower and Nixon both had the same approaches to using their formal powers as Chief Diplomat. They both wanted to make agreements with communist nations. However, Nixon was able to use more planning within making these agreements. In return, Nixon achieved his goals in establishing relationships with the communist powers. Eisenhower was unable to establish these relationships, but was able to keep peace during his presidency. Nixon also used more informal powers. Eisenhower began his role as chief legislator within foreign policy by supporting the idea of containment (Damms 2002, 27). He wanted to be able to keep peace with the USSR without spending too much money on the arms race. His problem was being able to accomplish the conflicting goals of having adequate defense, and keeping the nations debt low (Damms 2002, 29). As Chief Legislator, Eisenhower developed a plan called the New Look and used the formal power of recommending the plan to congress. The New Look supported Eisenhower’s views of containment without bankruptcy, it was a conservative program. Congress reviewed the recommendations and began implementing the New Look in 1955. The army would be reduced from 22 divisions to 14 and have the service and support units depleted, the navy and 125,000 personnel cut and were limited to 1000 ships. However, the air force increased form 115 airplanes to 137 (Damms 2002, 32). † Although congress enacted Eisenhower’s plans without much objections, this soon changed and Ike found that congress, the armed forces, and even his own administration n o longer supported the â€Å"New Look†. They feared that it was creating a missile gap. (Damms 2002, 32). President Eisenhower also faced great opposition within the Senate. Even though the Republicans controlled congress, he was at the peak of his popularity, and the communist threat was at its greatest, Republican Senator John Bricker of Ohio introduced an amendment that would limit Eisenhower’s formal powers as Chief Diplomat (Peterson 1994, 222). This amendment would requisition Article 6 of the Constitution and limit the president’s power to negotiate treaties and executive agreements. In 1954, even though Eisenhower had strongly opposed this amendment, it almost was passed, missing only one vote to gain the 2/3 of the senate necessary (Peterson 1994, 222). Eisenhower’s narrow victory and the continuing threat that the amendment may pass, deeply affected his approach to congress and foreign policy (Peterson 1994, 222). For example, Eisenhower agreed not to request approval of the human rights covenants, he also unwillingly signed a bill that required the president to send all executive agreements to the senate within 30 days of their implementation. Both show that Eisenhower made decisions that he would have not have made under other conditions (Peterson 1994, 222). In 1957 the soviets launched the first space satellite, Sputnik.